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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines to what extent performance plays a role in the repression of social 
movements. The Ferguson Uprising of 2014-2015 offers a unique case study of protest 
policing—from its spontaneous eruption to the swift and aggressive backlash it received—
and repression. The timeframe under study includes the ten days after the fatal shooting of 
Michael Brown. I demonstrate that feminist theories of performativity can be applied to 
repression research to develop a new way of analyzing the interactions between repressive 
actors (i.e., the state) and their targets (i.e., the people). Some view theories of organizations, 
power, or culture as single factors that explain repression, however repression in Ferguson 
defies these conventional understandings. I study repression in Ferguson through an analysis 
of mainstream media reports, published interviews, and social media accounts to conduct 
both quantitative and qualitative analyses of repressive tactics. Through those analyses, I 
challenge the current theories of repression, power, and performativity to show that the state 
adapted to protest conditions in Ferguson by testing various levels of repression. Ferguson 
changed the way the nation would view protest and police interactions. The Uprising’s 
effects still echo throughout the country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The image is now iconic. A man, later identified as Edward Crawford, Jr., wearing an 
American flag t-shirt and holding a bag of potato chips is captured mid-throw as he tosses a 
smoking canister of tear gas back at police who had launched the chemical weapon in hopes 
of dispersing the crowds that were gathered on the streets of Ferguson, Missouri. While most 
protesters had gone home, several dozen were still at an intersection about one mile south of 
the now-infamous QuikTrip gas station that was set on fire during a protest two days prior. 
The growing protests were in response to the shooting death of Michael Brown, 18, by a 
white Ferguson Police Department officer, Darren Wilson. Brown was unarmed and would 
become one of almost 300 black men killed by police in 2014 alone.1 An accidental 
participant in a night of protests, Crawford recalled that the scene he walked up to on West 
Florissant Avenue—police officers in riot gear beating batons on their shields—was “like 
something you’d see in a movie.”2 Later that evening, Crawford would be forcibly removed 
from his car as he was leaving the site of the protest. According to Crawford, police officers 
surrounded his vehicle and ripped his car door open. He was later charged with officer 
interference and assault.3 This came on the night of August 13, 2014—four days after 
Brown’s death—as tensions between the Ferguson community and police were growing. 
Crawford stated in a 2015 interview, “I didn’t throw a burning can back at police, I threw it 
out of the way of children.”4 
                                                          
1 Sinyangwe, McKesson, and Packyetti, “Mapping Police Violence.” 
 
2 Hunn, “Subject of Iconic Photo Speaks of Anger, Excitement.” 
 
3 Ibid. Note: These charges were filed nearly a year after the incident.  
 
4 Bell, “Protester Featured in Iconic Ferguson Photo Found Dead of Self-Inflicted Gunshot Wound.” 
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The repressive arm of the state has become ever more adroit at crushing rebellions, 
riots, and uprisings. In light of this, what can we learn about both the state and the people in 
times of modern day extrajudicial killings of unarmed Black men? In this paper, I draw on 
theories of repression, discourse, and performativity to provide a feminist intervention 
contributing to scholarship on repression. I also examine theories of power and violence as 
they pertain to state repression. How can we further our current understanding of the 
repression used against protests that come in the wake of extreme state-sanctioned violence 
and death? By scrutinizing the policing of the protest events in Ferguson, we can move 
towards analyzing and predicting responses to other protest events. The Ferguson Uprising 
offers a unique case study of protest policing due to its spontaneous eruption and the swift 
and aggressive backlash it received. I aim to show that feminist theories of performativity 
can be applied to repression research to develop a new way of analyzing the interactions 
between repressive actors (i.e., the state) and their targets (i.e., the people). 
The state’s use of lethal power has plagued Black communities in the United States 
for centuries. When police were first formed and given authority by the state it was to 
terrorize Black people in the form of slave catchers and has continued, as Angela Davis 
states, in an “unbroken stream of racist violence.”5 This police terror has only evolved as 
technology and society has advanced—more lethal and effective weaponry at their disposal, 
more intricate systems of incarceration and intimidation, more rhetoric vilifying communities 
of color as “terrorists” themselves.6 The Ferguson Uprising began on August 10th, 2014, the 
day after Michael Brown was killed. Community members-turned-protesters were met with a 
                                                          
5 Davis, “From Michael Brown to Assata Shakur, the Racist State of America Persists.” 
 
6 Nocella II, “The Rise of the Terrorization of Dissent.”  
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heavy police presence and officers equipped in riot gear as the peaceful march of close to one 
thousand residents devolved into violence and looting.7 One marcher was quick to make the 
connection between the night’s activities and the shooting that had taken place the previous 
day saying, “if they hadn't shot the kid, we wouldn't be doing this."8 This night would be the 
first of dozens of protests over the course of the next year—some of which numbered less 
than fifty while others swelled into the hundreds to nearly a thousand.9 In this paper, I 
examine the protests that took place from August 10, 2014 to August 20, 2014. I focus on the 
protests that occur in the evening and after nightfall.  
Due to the longevity and variety in size, motivation, and state response, Ferguson 
provides a unique case for studying state repression against social movements. In this 
Missouri town, we have the four groups of state actors performing varying levels of 
repressive tactics against the same group of people. The contentious community relations 
between the Ferguson Police Department and residents of Ferguson coupled with 
discriminatory policing practices created a hostile environment in Ferguson long before 
August 2014. The United States Department of Justice report of their in-depth investigation 
of the Ferguson Police Department indicates extensive patterns of constitutional rights 
violations by the department.10 A history of disparate practices which disproportionately 
affect African American residents and serve to erode the trust of the community in the police 
have led to a tense relationship in Ferguson among law enforcement officers and community 
members. External law enforcement agencies such as the Missouri National Guard—which 
                                                          
7 Lippmann, “Peaceful Protest Against Police Brutality Turns Into Night Of Violence.” 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Trump, Kris-Stella, Williamson, and Einstein.  
 
10 United States. Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department. 
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was called in to Ferguson during various protests—were accused of harboring personnel with 
openly fascist or racist inclinations.11 This suggests that research into the repression seen in 
Ferguson is not only timely but a necessary investigation of how various processes interact 
with one another to inform decision making and collective action on the part of the state.  
Brown’s death and the aftermath of his shooting has sparked studies in multiple 
disciplines including, but not limited to, sociology, psychology, critical criminology, and 
political science. Through my research, I bring into conversation the field of repression 
research in sociology and feminist theorizing to analyze the ways in which the state’s tactics 
and interactions are informed by various contributing factors. The study of repression in an 
age of general political unrest is necessary so that we may develop a better understanding of 
how the state adapts its performance of repression to the people’s performance of protest. 
With growing police militarization and persistence of violence against Black protest, a theory 
of repression that is informed by feminist theory is becoming increasingly important. As part 
of my study I demonstrate how various domains of power work together to shape repressive 
tactics used against protests. The domains of power—also known as the matrix of 
domination—that was put forth by sociologist and Black feminist theorist Patricia Hill 
Collins offers a path towards analyzing state repression in Ferguson through the four 
domains: structural, disciplinary, hegemonic, and interpersonal (Allen 2009). This matrix 
provides a useful tool of analysis by which we can understand the dynamics present in 
Ferguson. The structural domain relates to the social structures of society such as the law. 
The disciplinary domain “consists of bureaucratic organizations whose task it is to control 
and organize human behavior through routinization, rationalization, and surveillance” (Allen 
                                                          
11 El-Enany, “Ferguson and the Politics of Policing Radical Protest.” 
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2009:8). The hegemonic domain lends credibility to oppression through dominant ideologies 
and even the language used. Collins sees this as the domain that links all other domains 
together. Finally, the interpersonal domain refers to the personal relationships and daily 
interactions that make up our lives. These domains played out on the streets of Ferguson as 
the state and protesters came into contact with one another.  
In this paper, I first review relevant literature pertaining to theories of repression, 
performativity, power, and discourse. Repression as broadly defined by some scholars of 
sociology is an action by the state or private entities that serves to “prevent, control, or 
constrain non-institutional, collective action (e.g. protest), including its initiation” (Earl 
2011:263). This is the definition that I utilize while discussing repression throughout the 
Ferguson Uprising. I take the “law enforcement characteristics”12 and “threat weakness” 
approaches outlined by Jennifer Earl, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy (2003). I also 
briefly consider methods of political repression as outlined by Anthony J. Nocella II (2013). 
In my review, I divide the literature into four categories: (1) defining repression, (2) the 
power of repression, (3) the language of repression, and (4) the performance of repression. I 
review literature that defines repression as collective action as well as literature on theorizing 
repressive tactics (i.e., “threat weakness” and “law enforcement characteristics” (Earl, et al. 
2003). In order to analyze the power of repression, I first look at militarization of police 
departments using studies by Peter B. Kraska regarding the Pentagon’s Law Enforcement 
Support Office—commonly known as the 1033 Program. I then turn to James Rule and 
theories of collective violence. I consider the language of repression through concepts of 
incrimination and terrorization. The scholar Robin Wagner-Pacifici provides a foundation for 
                                                          
12 Earl also refers to this as “police agency” in other works on repression.   
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this paper’s examination of incrimination while I return to Anthony J. Nocella II and his 
theories on the “terrorization of dissent” (2013). Finally, I review literature on performativity 
and assemblage. I examine the performative theory of assembly as put forth by Judith Butler 
(2015). I also examine repression repertoires as theorized by prominent social movement 
scholar Charles Tilly. I end the section on performance with Jeffrey Alexander and his 
studies of the performance of power. In the review of the literature, I synthesize the above 
fields to demonstrate that there is an opportunity to expand upon the literature for explaining 
how the performances of repressive forces adapt over the course of a protest event as they 
learn how to respond in the moment while still making calculations of how they ought to 
perform repression in the future.  
Next, I describe the methods used to gather and analyze data on the three protest 
events described previously. I begin with applying Peter B. Kraska’s four dimension military 
model to the law enforcement agencies involved in Ferguson to measure the extent of 
militarization in each police department (2007:503). In order to analyze the protest events, I 
use newspaper and media reports, published interviews, government issued reports, and 
social media posts to determine the repressive tactics used by various law enforcement 
agencies that were deployed in Ferguson throughout the year of protest. I show how the types 
of repression tactics used varied across time. I use a textual analysis of new sources, written 
first person accounts, and photographs to create a narrative of events. I code the protest event 
by documenting the size of the police (and other agencies) presence, the types of tactics 
used—ranging from militarized dress to weaponry usage, and number of arrests made during 
an event. This methodology is informed by the operationalization developed by Earl, et al. 
for police responses to protests (2003).  
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I find in my analysis of the law enforcement agencies involved in policing the 
Ferguson Uprising that the more militarized the force, the more repressive the tactics that are 
deployed—including frequent use of tear gas and riot control smoke canisters, greater arrests, 
and repeated use of heavier artillery with little regard for rules of engagement. The less 
militarized the force—specifically in the case of the Missouri State Highway Patrol—the less 
repressive tactics were used against protesters. If an agency had at its disposal the means to 
adopt and exaggerate a militaristic deployment, the more likely it was to utilize the resources 
available even if the use of those tools and tactics were disproportionate to the given protest.  
In this paper, I first review relevant literature. Then I describe the methodology that I 
used to explore my research question. Next, I provide an analysis of the data I collected. 
Finally, I discuss the results of my study. I make the case that the events of the Ferguson 
Uprising offer a turning point in repression research and can show that the state is evolving 
its tactics used against demonstrators. We can use this study as a tool for analyzing other 
uprisings and the state’s response to collective action taken in the fight for racial justice.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
In 2014, police across the United States killed 1,131 people – 293 of which were 
Black men13. These statistics are particularly alarming when we consider that Black men 
make up only 6 percent of the population14 yet constituted 26 percent of those killed by 
police in 2014. That year also saw several “high profile” cases in which police killed 
unarmed black men. Depictions of their deaths spread across social media and spawned 
                                                          
13 https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ 
14 US Census Data Sets   
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hashtag campaigns that would launch a movement. The months leading up to Michael 
Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri on August 9, 2014, saw the murders of Eric Garner15 
and John Crawford III16. After Brown’s death, Tamir Rice17 and Akai Gurley18 were also 
killed by police and generated outrage among the local community and the nation at large. 
Given the tumultuous year filled with hundreds of extrajudicial killings of Black men, how 
did this site of collective action become a stage for evolving tactics on the part of law 
enforcement and demonstrators?  
In this paper, I draw on theories of repression, discourse, and performativity to 
provide a feminist intervention contributing to discussions on repression. I also examine 
theories of power and violence as they pertain to state repression. How can we further our 
current understanding of the repression used against protests that come in the wake of 
extreme violence? By scrutinizing the policing of the protest events in Ferguson, we can 
move towards analyzing and predicting responses to other protest events. The Ferguson 
Uprising offers a unique case study of protest policing—from its spontaneous eruption to the 
swift and aggressive backlash it received—and thus offers a potential for adding to the 
current literature on repression. I aim to show that feminist theories of performativity can be 
applied to repression research to develop a new way of analyzing the interactions between 
repressive actors (i.e., the state) and their targets (i.e., the people). In this review, I synthesize 
the fields examined below to demonstrate that there is an opportunity to expand upon the 
                                                          
15 Sullivan, “Man Dies after Suffering Heart Attack during Arrest.”  
16 Green, “John Crawford Shooting.” 
17 Fitzsimmons, “12-Year-Old Boy Dies After Police in Cleveland Shoot Him - The New York Times.” 
18 Goodman, “In Brooklyn, 2 Young Men, a Dark Stairwell and a Gunshot.”  
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present literature for explaining how the performances of repressive forces adapt over the 
course of a protest event as they learn how to respond in the moment while still making 
calculations of how they ought to perform repression in the future.  
Defining Repression 
Repression as Collective Action. Social movement scholars define collective action as 
actions performed in concert by a collection of individuals to “promote the interest of one’s 
in-group” (Montiel and Christie 2017). Collective action generally relates to movements by 
marginalized groups or even advantaged groups on behalf of marginalized groups (e.g. white 
college students participating in demonstrations supporting the Civil Rights Movement). 
However, in this review, I apply this definition of collective action to the repressive state 
forces in order to show how actions taken by various law enforcement agencies (both local 
and federal) were a form of collective action that utilized tactics of repression. In studying 
collective action as a feature of the state, we can expand our understanding of how the state 
operates and expands its tactical repertoires as it approaches protest events.   
Repression Theories. The dominant theoretical approaches that Jennifer Earl and 
others discuss in several papers include the ideas of “threat and weakness” and “law 
enforcement characteristics” (Earl 2003, 2011; Earl and Soule 2006; Earl, Soule, and 
McCarthy 2006) which can be used to analyze the Ferguson Uprising - its inception and the 
State’s response. Jennifer Earl, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy test explanations of 
policing protest through four theoretical perspectives which include “threat and weakness” 
and “law enforcement characteristics”19 (2003). In this review, I focus on the application of 
threat and weakness and law enforcement characteristics as tools for analysis of the state’s 
                                                          
19 Referred to as “Police Agency Approach” by Earl, Soule, and McCarthy (2003) 
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response to the Ferguson Uprising. I also briefly consider methods of political repression as 
outlined by Anthony J. Nocella II (2013). 
Threat and Weakness. Earl argues the “threat weakness” theoretical approach sees 
that movements are more likely to be targets of repression if they are viewed highly 
threatening and weak (Earl 2003; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003). This approach merges 
the “threat model” and the “weakness model” to suggest that these models inform one 
another and that a movement’s relative threat and weakness together determine the level of 
repression it receives.  
Law Enforcement Characteristics. Earl suggests that the characteristics of law 
enforcement agencies predict the types of repression and level of repression used against 
protesters (Earl 2003). These characteristics include “police administration openness to 
protest, prior history of brutality by agency, and agency preparation” (Earl 2003:53). Earl et 
al. indicate that there is little adjudication within repression research between the approaches 
listed.  
Political Repression. Anthony Nocella describes the four types of political repression 
as: (1) incrimination; (2) infiltration; (3) interrogation; (4) incarceration (Nagel and Nocella 
2013:13). In Ferguson, MO throughout the three protest events, there is clear evidence of the 
use of incrimination and incarceration as weapons of repression. Nocella argues that labeling 
theory (and more specifically stigmatization) is an integral tool of incrimination that allows 
deviance to be pointed out and punished through repressive tactics. Nocella proposes that 
repression of protest has evolved into the “terrorization of dissent” (2013:14). He goes on to 
elaborate on the concept of political repression to encompass “legal and illegal targeting, 
covert or overt, of political activists to control, eliminate, and/or weaken their ability to 
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create political change” (2013:19). It is this definition that fits the model of repression 
deployed in Ferguson by different levels of state agencies. Nocella indicates that dissent and 
repression will increase in unison until the burden on those dissenting becomes too great 
(2013:19). I suggest that Ferguson can offer more insight into the mechanisms of repression 
given its particular climate and the events that led a community to make demands of the 
state.  
The Power of Repression 
 Militarization. Another contributing factor to the prevalence of police shootings is 
the militarization of United States police forces. Increased militarization of United States law 
enforcement agencies has become an area of study that is useful in examining repression of 
social movements. Peter B. Kraska defines police militarization as the process by which 
“civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the military model” 
(2007:504). He proposes four different continuums by which militarization can be 
understood (2007). He identifies those continuums as: (1) material, (2) cultural, (3) 
organizational, and (4) operational (2007:504). Each of these operate on a scale of low to 
high militarization. All indicators discussed by Kraska can be used as a metric by which to 
analyze the response of the various law enforcement agencies throughout the protest cycle in 
Ferguson. The Pentagon’s Law Enforcement Support Office20—known as the 1033 
program—has allowed civilian police departments to gain access to military grade equipment 
such as assault rifles, grenade launchers, and bullet-proof armored vehicles. Kraska also 
details the ways in which the military has been repurposed at times throughout history to 
serve various roles in the community (e.g. its use in the “War on Drugs”) which further blurs 
                                                          
20 Rezvani et al., “MRAPs And Bayonets.” 
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the distinction between the police and the military (2007). Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler 
(1997) document the exponential increase in paramilitary deployments to “barricaded 
suspects and civil demonstrations” over the last five decades.  
The Language of Repression 
The process of incrimination as a repressive tactic serves to shape the discourse 
surrounding protest which in turn determines the responses of state actors towards protesters. 
Through strategies of stigmatization, certain actions by the repressive state can be justified—
even as those actions far exceed the perceived use of force that is required to manage even a 
sizeable nonviolent protest.  
Incrimination. The discourse surrounding who gets to show up and how they are able 
to present themselves (Wagner-Pacifici 2000) shapes the response of both protesters and 
police and their performance of their given roles in protest events. The expectation of 
violence on the part of the police—due to rhetoric that criminalizes community members—
shapes their response just as the presentation of law enforcement (i.e. uniforms and 
weaponry) shape the response of protesters. This performance of violence—both its 
expression and repudiation—serve to create and reconcile tensions that exist within the 
community-police dynamic (Wagner-Pacifici 2000). However, as Wagner-Pacific elucidates, 
the discourse from law enforcement and government agents is “masquerading, fictionalizing 
the real actions of those in power” (1994:7) which lends a legitimacy to their violence and a 
criminality to the violence of demonstrators—both actual and perceived.  
Nadine El-Enany suggests that the state has an interest in weaponizing their own 
power to delegitimize and weaken the power of political protest activity (2015). Law 
enforcement will often label protesters as criminals and the act of assembling a crime. This 
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incrimination and stigmatization of protest on the part of law enforcement serves, in El-
Enany’s view, to “depoliticize” (2015:3) protest and legitimize the repressive response of the 
state. By removing the political nature of the protest (i.e., stressing the importance of “law 
and order” over justice and removing the inherently political nature of protest through 
incrimination tactics), the state shifts the discourse and foundation upon which the protests 
were built. I agree with this view point and her further assertion that police do not act from a 
“neutral” position when on the periphery of a demonstration (2015:4). When entering the 
protest area, already established views of the community—who El-Enany describes as “the 
enemy within” (2015:5)—contribute to the eventual actions taken by law enforcement 
officers. This perspective shapes the responses from government officials and their decisions 
to call for reinforcement from outside forces. The ability to characterize protesters as 
deviants allows for the uneven use of force on the community as a whole. A handful of 
protesters participating in property destruction or alleged looting facilitate a heavy handed 
approach to managing the crowd as a whole. El-Enany was writing prior to the grand jury’s 
non-indictment verdict thus does not analyze the entire scope of protests that stemmed from 
Michael Brown’s death. Due to the dozens of protests that occurred within the year following 
August 9, 2014, this cycle of depoliticizing-labeling-repoliticizing that can occur during 
protests can be expanded and applied to the other events in the scope of this study.  
The Performance of Repression 
 Robin Wagner-Pacifici says of the police: “they constantly reveal the violence of the 
state in their uniformed appearance and their methods” (1994:125). That the very presence of 
police officers can serve a repressive function in certain communities betrays the notion of 
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protection and contributes to a tension and distrust of law enforcement within the 
community.  
Performative Theory of Assembly. We can see in Judith Butler’s view that people 
gathered as a way to “struggle against precarity” (2015:69)—which, for Ferguson in August 
of 2014, was a struggle against death via an extrajudicial killing by a police officer. But it 
was also greater than that. The people of Ferguson were also struggling for space and 
visibility within their community. However, the assemblage of various law enforcement 
agencies over time in various capacities betrayed their supposed duties of protection. The 
perceived disposability of the community of Ferguson gave rise to the performance of power 
by law enforcement that was ultimately violent and disruptive. In what ways can we apply 
Butler’s performative theory of assembly, then, to the law enforcement response in 
Ferguson? To what extent is a theory that comes from an analysis of the marginalized useful 
in analyzing power at the top? I suggest that this can be useful in understanding the state’s 
response to a precarious group of people.  
Repression Repertoires. As a long-time movement scholar, Charles Tilly has much to 
contribute to the understanding of the actions that occurred in Ferguson. For the purpose of 
this paper, I focus on his theory of contentious performances and the designation of 
repertoires available to groups. In the context of the Ferguson uprising we can consider what 
repertoires law enforcement agencies had at their disposal and which repertoires they used to 
control dissent in the events under investigation. Tilly details four different types of 
repertoires available to a given collective. Ranging from “no”, “weak”, “strong”, and “rigid” 
(2008:15), we can apply these rubrics to repressive forces to discern what repertoires the 
state has at its disposal to utilize. I argue that law enforcement agencies moved between 
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strong and rigid repertoires. Strong repertoires, per Tilly, allow for innovations (however 
small) whereas rigid repertoires entail the repetition of routines (2008:15). The repertoires 
used as part of their performances allowed for particular uses of force and violence within the 
repressive framework.  Tilly, in describing strong repertoires, states that combinations of 
actions do not occur and that there are visible boundaries of performances (2008:68). I 
diverge from Tilly here on two accounts. I contend, first, that there were a diversity of tactics 
utilized in Ferguson by law enforcement. Second, I suggest that there is a discrepancy when 
it comes to boundaries set by law enforcement agencies – that they did not stabilize and 
acquire visible boundaries – these got murkier over time (2008:68).  
Performing Power. For Jeffrey Alexander in his book Performance and Power, 
performance in a movement situation can be understood as actors authentically performing a 
script so as to persuade other actors to follow suit and participate in the performance 
(2011:23). This definition of performance can be applied to the Ferguson uprising and the 
performance of law enforcement officers.  
Synthesis 
The theories discussed in this section do not occur in isolation but as “ideal types”—
ways of neatly constructing analyses of repression and protest. However, none of the above 
theories can stand alone as adequate methods of analysis. How can we approach repression 
research from another angle that relies on both performance and discourse as factors and 
shapers of protest responses – and the responses of the state to a given protest? In 
synthesizing these fields of inquiry, we can create a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between the (repressive) state and the people. It is possible to apply a theory of 
performativity to protest and repression so that we may see how the state practices its 
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repressive actions in order to fine tune and adapt to the increasing agitation that has been 
festering throughout the United States. 
METHODS 
My research topic can be framed as this: to what extent is the state’s repressive 
response to protest an act of performativity? Does the resource capacity of the law 
enforcement agencies shape the types of tactics used? In order to answer that question, I 
examine (1) the extent of militarization of the law enforcement agencies involved in 
Ferguson, (2) if militarization played a central role in the repression tactics that were used 
during protest episode, and (3) the characteristics of the protests that received the most severe 
repression.  In this study, I conducted an historical analysis of community-police relations in 
Ferguson, constructed a timeline of events for the episode under investigation, and 
determined what types of repression tactics were used through the protest wave to answer 
how performativity plays a role in state interactions with the people during protest events. 
 There were different approaches I could have taken to answer the questions I 
consider. I had intended to use a mix of available data and interviews in order to fully 
contextualize the repression I was studying. However, in the process of collecting news 
sources to examine for determining repressive tactics used, I found that conducting new 
interviews would not be necessary. There were enough interviews within the texts that I was 
analyzing for me to gain insight into the community’s response to Michael Brown’s death 
and the protests and law enforcement responses that happened in the aftermath. The 
extensive coverage of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, a local Missouri newspaper, proved to be 
a rich resource for data collection. Their coverage included almost daily updates to 
developing protests and incorporated historical contexts of community-police relations. The 
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St. Louis Post-Dispatch also had extensive video and photographic coverage of the events 
under study. Their coverage of the Ferguson Uprising was compiled into an eBook available 
on Apple iBooks titled #Ferguson. This book contained the Pulitzer Prize-Winning 
Photography from the Post-Dispatch as well as supplementary commentary regarding the 
impact of the photographs.  
In addition to local news coverage, there was wide coverage of the protests by 
national and international news groups. Several national news reporters were on the ground 
in Ferguson and had negative interactions with law enforcement officials themselves. Out of 
this coverage came a book by Wesley Lowery, a reporter for the Washington Post, titled 
They Can’t Kill Us All: Ferguson, Baltimore, and a New Era in America’s Racial Justice 
Movement. In this book, Lowery recounts his role in covering the Ferguson Uprising as well 
as his own arrest two days after arriving in Ferguson. Through firsthand accounts and 
interviews with Ferguson residents, Lowery gives a unique perspective of the situation that 
developed in Ferguson as well as revisiting the city a year later as protests continued.  This 
book provided very useful information that gave me an insider’s perspective on the events 
that transpired in Ferguson throughout the year.  
I used a Lexis Nexis search of articles written about the Ferguson protest from August 
9, 2014 to September 1, 2014 in order to construct an historical narrative of the events that 
transpired during the episode. I was able to use both local and national news sources to 
gather information for a timeline construction of each episode. At times, I followed 
embedded links in the articles to find updates or reflective coverage that fell outside of the 
original search timeframe. I compiled a set of 43 articles and live feeds pertaining to the 
events that transpired from August 10, 2014 to August 20, 2014. This included major events, 
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law enforcement agencies involved, protest size, police responses, and arrests made. A data 
set compiled by an investigative team at NPR allowed for me to compile a list of military 
equipment that was transferred to the St. Louis County Police through the 1033 weapons 
exchange program21. I was also able to utilize a Reddit live feed which collected live streams, 
social media posts, and scanner activity to report on the ground activity in Ferguson22.  
Defining the Episode 
For this project, I initially identified three specific potential protests which I call 
“episodes”—each of which occurred over the course of several days. The first protest episode 
occurred in the days following the death of Brown (i.e., Episode One). The dates for Episode 
One are August 10, 2014 through August 20, 2014. The second (i.e., Episode Two) came 
after the non-indictment of Officer Wilson. The dates for Episode Two are November 24, 
2014 through December 2, 2014. The third episode (i.e., Episode Three) I identified as the 
protests that occurred after the one year anniversary of Brown’s death. Those dates include 
August 9, 2015 through August 11, 2015. I used a data set developed by Vanessa 
Williamson, Kris-Stella Trump, and Katherine Levine Einstein (2018) to identify highly 
attended events throughout the year immediately following Brown’s death. I focused on 
timespans that included multiple dates of protest and ones that had crowds of at least 50 
people. I decided to focus on the first ten days of protests (i.e., Episode One) as this episode 
had the most interactions between various degrees of militarized law enforcement agencies. 
Each of the days saw interactions during the day as well as evening interactions between 
protesters and law enforcement agencies. My data focuses on those interactions that occurred 
                                                          
21 Rezvani et al., “MRAPs And Bayonets.” 
 
22 “Live Feed for Riot and Protest in Ferguson, MO. Scanner Reports, News Links.” 
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in the evening hours as these saw the most dynamic interactions. I also narrowed the 
geography of the protests to those that occurred near Brown’s death on Canfield Drive as 
well as those on West Flourissant Avenue.  
Operationalizing the Indicators 
To begin analyzing the militarization of the law enforcement agencies that interacted 
in Ferguson, I examine the department using militarization indicator scales developed by 
Peter B. Kraska. His indicators accounted for (1) material, (2) cultural, (3) organizational, 
and (4) operational factors that can be measured on a continuum from “low militarization” to 
“high militarization.” (2007).  
Figure 1. Militarization Scale 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low Militarization                 Material Indicators   High Militarization 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low Militarization                 Cultural Indicators   High Militarization 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low Militarization          Organizational Indicators  High Militarization 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     Low Militarization                                Operational Indicators    High Militarization 
 Material factors are described as the “extent of martial weaponry (e.g., automatic 
weapons, armored personnel carriers) and equipment, and use of advanced military 
technology.”  
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 Cultural factors describe “the extent of martial language, military style in appearance 
(military battle-dress utilities or BDUs), extent of militarism (military belief, 
values).”  
 Organizational indicators are the “extent of martial arrangements: ‘command 
control’ centers (e.g., COMPSTAT), normalized use of elite squads of officers 
(SWAT teams) patterned after military special operations (e.g., Navy Seals) teams.”  
 Operational indicators constitute the “extent of operational patterns modeled after 
the military such as in the areas of intelligence gathering, supervision, handling high-
risk situations, highly aggressive and punitive operations such as some zero-tolerance 
initiatives (e.g., SWAT teams used to conduct no-knock drug warrants” (Kraska 
2007:504).  
These scales allowed me to gauge the relative militarization of each of the law enforcement 
agencies as a baseline for the types of repressive tactics that might be used against protesters. 
The agencies I identified in the protests were the Ferguson Police Department (FPD), St. 
Louis County Police (SLCP), Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP), and Missouri National 
Guard (MNG). This scale is also useful in informing the ways I have coded protest event 
data. Governmental reports also proved instrumental in analyzing the Ferguson department. 
The National Defense Authorization Act (also known as the 1033 Program) allowed for a 
record of weapons previously used for military purposes which were transferred to the St. 
Louis County Police and Ferguson Police for use against civilians.   
While Earl, et al. explain that “researchers [of repression] have typically employed 
logistic regressions when studying the policing of protest events” (2003:589), I used mixed 
methodologies to analyze repression in Ferguson. I combined both quantitative and 
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qualitative analyses in order to code actions taken (and, sometimes, more importantly not 
taken) by the various law enforcement agencies involved in Ferguson during the protest 
events. Earl, et al. describe five categories of police responses to protests. These approaches 
include:  
 Do Nothing: “officers show up at a protest event but take no further action” 
 Nothing to See Here: “officers show up and take only limited action (which excludes 
making arrests or using force)”  
 Ounce of Prevention/Legal Eagles: “officers attempt to prevent disorder by erecting 
barricades, reacting to protest by making arrests, or combining the use of barricades 
with arrests” 
 Dirty Harry: “exclusively uses force (including hand-to-hand conflict and/or the use 
of weapons)”  
 Calling All Cars: “officers combine both force and arrests/prevention” (2003:152)  
I applied this rubric for coding varied police responses to the Ferguson protests. I gave “do 
nothing” responses a score of two (2), “nothing to see here” responses a score of four (4), 
“ounce of prevention” approaches a score of six (6), “dirty Harry” approaches a score of 
eight (8), and “calling all cars” approaches a score of ten (10). I developed this scoring 
technique in order for this data to be relative to the militarization continuum scores that were 
on a scale of ten as well. At various points throughout the protests, law enforcement agencies 
utilized these responses—often moving towards more repressive tactics as the day progressed 
with the most repressive tactics saved for nighttime protests. After effectively locating each 
agencies on Kraska’s continuum of militarization, I then coded the use of repressive tactics 
(e.g., the deployment of riot control agents, barrier usage, etc.) for the protest episode. This 
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coding method allowed me to determine the relationship between militarization and 
performance in the Ferguson protest events.  
Replicability  
This research design is easily replicable to other protest events where repression is 
used. The same research methodologies and coding strategies can be applied to less localized 
events. Other research could be conducted on a larger scale to look at how protests in 
response to police killings are repressed on a multi-city or national scale. Given that many 
police departments across the country have been benefactors of the 1033 program23, the 
application of this method might provide insight into how repression has escalated with the 
rise of militarized departments. It could develop into a useful tool for predicting state 
responses to various protest episodes by recognizing patterns of performance in repressive 
actions taken by state actors.  
RESULTS 
Given the proclaimed standards of “democracy” and “freedom” in the United States, 
it is concerning to see the ways in which an escalating set of repressive forces were deployed 
to a community of slightly over 20,000 residents (two-thirds of whom are Black)24. The 
scope, severity, and presence of “outside” forces created a situation that rested along a 
continuum of various repressive actions that could come out of a scene from an authoritarian 
dictatorship. As stated previously, repression is an action by the state or private entities that 
serves to “prevent, control, or constrain non-institutional, collective action (e.g. protest), 
                                                          
23 79,288 assault rifles, 205 grenade launchers, and 11,959 bayonets—along with other gear and equipment—
were transferred nationally through the program from 2006 to 2014. (Rezvani et al. 2014) 
  
24 U.S. Census Bureau “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Ferguson City, Missouri.”  
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including its initiation” (Earl 2011:263). I utilize this definition of repression in my analysis 
of repression throughout the first ten days of the Ferguson Uprising. 
The events that occurred between August 10, 2014 and August 20, 2014 were 
emotionally charged and, at times, chaotic. Table 1 describes a few of the major daily events 
as well as which agencies were involved each day. Some of these events would become the 
impetus for more violent responses on the part of various law enforcement agencies and 
protesters as the groups interacted. When new developments or even lack of progress towards 
justice occurred, the state of relations between the state and the protesters would devolve into 
hostility, anger, and violence. The reactions were largely dependent on which state actors 
were on the streets each night.  
Militarization 
 Charles Tilly writes extensively about collective action and explains that those who 
perform collectively have a relatively small repertoire for action (Tilly 1978:151). When put 
in the context of collective action by repressive actors we see that the interactions between 
local and federal law enforcement agencies create advanced repertoires of violence through 
militarized weaponry and militaristic tactical approaches. The escalation observed in 
Ferguson through the protest episodes also displays a flexible repertoire that was available to 
state actors allowing them to diversify the methods used to repress the Uprising. This was 
particularly evident as more agencies were called in to attempt to quell the dissent taking 
place in the streets. I analyzed the extent to which the four law enforcement agencies were 
militarized via Kraska’s continuum of militarization and placed them on each of the scales25. 
  
                                                          
25 See Chart 1 
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Table 1: Major events during protest episode and agencies involved.  
  
Agency 
Involved 
Date Major Event(s) 
F
P
D
 
S
L
C
P
 
M
S
H
P
 
M
N
G
 
10-Aug 
 Candlelit vigil for Brown begins the day 
 QuikTrip Gas station is burned down 
 SLCP immediately takes over from FPD following shooting 
    
11-Aug 
 Police form a staging area 
 Tear gas used to clear QuikTrip—a gathering spot for protest 
    
12-Aug 
 One officer suspended for threatening to kill protesters 
 Preliminary autopsy released  
    
13-Aug 
 Reporters and aldermen are arrested  
 SWAT team deployed 
 Police fire tear gas, flashbangs, and rubber bullets 
    
14-Aug 
 Gov. Nixon declares MSHP will take over operations  
 Attorney General Holder meets with Ferguson officials  
 Protests are peaceful for the night 
    
15-Aug 
 FPD Chief releases video of Brown allegedly committing a 
robbery causing tensions to escalate 
 Wilson’s name is released to the public and violence increases 
    
16-Aug 
 Gov. Nixon declares State of Emergency 
 Curfew imposed from midnight to 5 am  
    
17-Aug 
 Curfew continues  
 LRAD deployed  
 Second Brown autopsy is released 
    
18-Aug 
 Gov. Nixon calls in Missouri National Guard; curfew lifted   
 Announce school closure from 8/19/14-8/21/14 
 Protester violence increases; Molotov cocktails thrown 
    
19-Aug 
 Kajieme Powell, 25 year old Black man, killed by St. Louis 
City Police just 2 miles from where Brown was shot 
 Heavier police presence; increased media presence  
    
20-Aug 
 Police raid a church being used as a meeting point and aid 
station for protesters 
 Last night of MNG presence 
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Chart 1. Assessing Extent of Militarization for Each Agency 
 
Ferguson Police Department. The Ferguson Police Department (FPD) was placed 
relatively low on the militarization continuum26 with an average score of 3.5/10. Given its 
perceived lack of excessive military weaponry, dress, and attitudes its material, its material 
and cultural indicators were both scored a four (4). However, according to the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) report, the FPD does have a history of “excessive force” given its reliance on 
electronic control weapons (ECWs), also known as Tasers27, as a response to low-level 
crimes by non-threatening individuals28. The DOJ also reported the FPD does have a history 
of unreasonable use of canines29. The Department of Justice report on the police response to 
protests details the extensive first amendment violations committed by the department. As 
outlined by the report in numerous areas, the FPD has a history of using disproportionately 
                                                          
26 See Chart 2 
 
27 United States. Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department. 
 
28 Ibid. 
 
29 Ibid.  
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aggressive tactics to nonviolent and low level offenders in the community. The FPD strayed 
slightly from Kraska’s description in that these militarized arrangements were not normalized 
patterns in daily interactions outside of the specific protest episode under investigation. Their 
tactics appear to be more informed by other agency interventions than by their own 
routinized protocol. Because of this, I scored their operational indicators as a four (4) as well. 
On the organizational indicator scale, I scored the FPD as a two (2). There did not seem to be 
a pattern of using “martial arrangements” (Kraska 2007:504) or a history of elite officers 
given that there are only 5330 officers in the department.  
St. Louis County Police. The St. Louis County Police received an average score of 
7.0/10 on the militarization scale. Due to regulations, tactical items from the 1033 program 
can only be traced at a county level31. The results of transfers as part of the program were 
available for St. Louis County (where the city of Ferguson is located). From February 2012 
until August 2014, St. Louis County reported receiving32: 
 6 night vision devices 
 15 reflector sights 
 3 night vision sights 
 1 laser borelight system 
 2 receiver-transmitters 
 12 - 5.56 millimeter rifles  
                                                          
30 Vicens, “Just How Segregated Is Ferguson?”. Note: 50 of those officers are white while only 3 are Black.  
 
31 Wofford, “How America’s Police Became an Army.” 
 
32 Rezvani et al., “MRAPs And Bayonets.” 
 
 6 - .45 caliber pistols 
 1 remote-controlled, heavy-duty robot 
tEODor (telerob Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal and observation robot)  
 9 utility trucks 
 2 cargo trailers
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I counted this equipment in the “material indicators” for militarization for the St. Louis 
County Police. This data coupled with visuals of mine-resistant, ambush-protected 
vehicles, or MRAPs, led me to place the St. Louis County Police high on the 
militarization scale33 with a score of nine (9). The St. Louis County Police response to 
protests often included large riot shields and face coverings. Pictures and reports from the 
protests show officers in highly tactical gear, including camouflaged dress, protective 
pads for their knees and elbows, and assault packs34. They would often approach crowds 
with guns drawn and pointed at unarmed people. This shows a lack of proper military 
training but does suggest that officers were mimicking a militarized style engagement of 
perceived combatants. In one particular incident with the SLCP on August 11, we can see 
a half dozen officers in military fatigues, combat boots, helmets, knee padding, and 
goggles approach an unarmed Black man with guns directly pointed at him35. This led me 
to place the SLCP with a score of seven (7) on the cultural indicator scale. Operational 
indicators were also ranked highly on the militarization continuum with a score of six (6). 
The tactics used by law enforcement were highly criticized as disproportionate to the 
protests. During a protest event, snipers were stationed with guns trained on the crowd. 
SWAT teams raided buildings used by protesters and reporters—including a church and a 
McDonalds. Due to this, I placed their operational indicators as a six (6) as well.  
                                                          
33 See Chart 2 
 
34 These were also acquired through the 1033 Program.  
 
35 Starr and Bruer, “Missouri Guard on Ferguson Protesters.” 
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Missouri State Highway Patrol. In contrast to the other agencies, the Missouri 
State Highway Patrol (MSHP) came to Ferguson without the backing of tanks and 
automatic weapons. This led to their low overall ranking of 1.5/1036. The Patrol often 
showed up to protest events wearing standard patrol uniforms without helmets or body 
armor. This agency did have access to smoke canisters and tear gas but seldom deployed 
the control agents on crowds. I assigned a score of three (3) for their material indicators 
and a one (1) for their cultural indicators. Their organizational indicators also scored a 
one (1) as they took a much less martial angle to dealing with angry protesters. The 
officers can often be seen in line with the protesters—even standing arm-in-arm with 
them in daytime marches. At times the MSHP would move protesters away from other 
agencies in an attempt to deescalate the situation and prevent violence from occurring. 
This led me to assign a score of one (1) for their operational indicator as well. Overall, 
this was the least militarized agency of the four and maintained the longest period of non-
violence on the part of protesters in the ten days of protest.  
Missouri National Guard. The Missouri National Guard was activated by 
Governor Jay Nixon on August 18 and withdrew on August 21, 2014. As a division of the 
military, this necessarily positions the Missouri National Guard high on the militarization 
scale37. They were given the highest score of the four agencies with a 9.0/10. James Rule 
states that collective violence is the “deliberate destruction of persons or property by 
people acting together” (1998:11). Although this is generally applied to social 
                                                          
36 See Chart 2 
 
37 See Chart 2 
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movements generated at a grassroots level, we can suggest that the state—specifically in 
the case of Ferguson—acted in accordance with this designation. The collective violence 
that was performed by law enforcement agencies that were deployed in Ferguson cannot 
be analyzed without also considering that the Missouri National Guard had been accused 
of employing officers accused of holding explicitly white supremacist viewpoints and 
discriminating against Black guard members38. This same Guard was deployed to 
Ferguson in order to provide support to local law enforcement agencies. We must then 
ask: to what extent do these personal viewpoints contribute to collective action and 
violence? I suggest that the views of fascists and racists must necessarily influence the 
behavior of the group, thus determining the actions of the whole on behalf of the few. 
Due to this history, I ranked the Missouri National Guard high on the cultural indicator 
scale with a score of nine (9). Reports nearly a year after the uprising show that the MNG 
also referred to protesters as “enemy forces”39 Because the Missouri National Guard is a 
dual-function department comprised of “citizen-soldiers”40 who can be activated to 
“domestic service”41 by the Governor for emergency purposes as well as service abroad, 
National Guard members receive a ten-week basic training course along with 
                                                          
38 Editorial Board, “Missouri Guard Needs Outside Help to Fix Discrimination Problem.” and Messenger, 
“Guard Officer Fired after Bias Complaints.” 
39 Starr and Bruer, “Missouri Guard on Ferguson Protesters.” 
 
40 Army National Guard, “Missouri | National Guard.” 
41 Army National Guard, “Guard FAQs | National Guard.” 
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individualized training upon completion42. This necessarily positions them high on each 
indicator in this scale.  
While in this section I described the overall pattern of militarization of the 
agencies involved, these militarization indicators shifted throughout the responses to the 
protest episode—typically varying (i.e., becoming more militarized) as the day 
progressed. My focus was to pay special attention to the responses of nighttime protests. 
What would start out as a “do nothing” approach, would escalate to a “calling all cars” 
approach while moving higher along the militarization continuum. Basic police uniforms 
were quickly replaced with assault rifles and military style camouflage as well as riot 
shields and assault vehicles. A reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch describes the 
evolution of the evening of August 19, 2014 in his notes:  
As the hour gets later, the crowds get younger and more aggressive. 
 
Then begins the familiar Ferguson ebb and flow of confrontations, bullhorn police 
warnings, street blockades, crowd dispersal and regrouping. They reach critical 
mass and erupt into scenes of tear gas clouds, pepper spray, masked men, pistol 
shots, breaking glass and stampeding crowds (Hampel 2014). 
 
Robin Wagner-Pacifici says of the police: “they constantly reveal the violence of 
the state in their uniformed appearance and their methods” (1994:125). That the very 
presence of police officers can serve a repressive function in certain communities betrays 
the notion of protection and contributes to a tension and distrust of law enforcement 
within the community. Throughout the Ferguson Uprising, law enforcement officers and 
                                                          
42 Army National Guard, “Basic Combat Training | National Guard.” 
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National Guardsmen performed repressive actions through their clothing, comportment, 
and advanced weaponry. They met grieving protesters with a force and urgency that did 
not reflect the spirit of the demonstrations that were happening at the time. For example, 
reporter Jamelle Bouie describes43 a demonstration on the afternoon of August 13th, 2014 
that was large but largely peaceful and could have been handled through communication 
with organizers:  
Instead, they brought reinforcements. Police officers were replaced with 
camouflaged SWAT teams—clad in helmets and body armor—and batons were 
replaced with shotguns, high-powered rifles, and dogs…they weren’t interested in 
actual crowd control. On at least two occasions, they refused to let uninvolved 
bystanders go to their cars or leave the area. No, from their stance to their 
numbers, this was about intimidation. Two snipers monitored the demonstrators 
from their armored vehicles, and other police began to close off side streets and 
other exits, to prevent anyone from coming in (or going out, for that matter)… 
With the arrival of SWAT teams, the demonstration escalated into a standoff. And 
an hour after the teams’ arrival, they [police] began marching down the street and 
shouting orders. 
 
Agency Approaches  
In Ferguson, we have witnessed the ways law enforcement characteristics (Earl 
2003; Earl et al. 2003) have contributed to the tactics used (both by law enforcement 
agents and protesters) and the degree of repression that protesters faced. On the afternoon 
of August 9, 2014, crowds gathered in response to the fatal shooting of Brown. The 
backlash from residents in the wake of the shooting prompted “more than 60 area police 
officers to respond to the scene”44. The night of Michael Brown’s murder brought out 
                                                          
43 Bouie, “The Outrageous Police Actions in Ferguson, Missouri, Last Night.” 
 
44 Giegerich and Thorsen, “Officer Kills Ferguson Teen.” 
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Ferguson residents for a protest. Nearly two hundred people gathered near Canfield 
Drive, the site of the shooting. Tensions were high between community members and 
police. As mourners gathered, they were surveilled by a St. Louis County police officer 
in a SWAT vehicle. Police canines were brought out to “keep order” alongside police 
officers with assault rifles. This was in response to approximately 100 residents who 
gathered chanting “No Justice! No Peace!” outside of the Ferguson Police Department 
headquarters. The next week and a half would see community persistence and police 
responses escalate. The FPD would approach protests with an “ounce of prevention” that 
related to its relative lack of militarization and department size.  
On Sunday August 10, tensions continued to grow. Thirty two people are arrested 
in the course of the evening. Public outcry regarding the police response during the first 
days was quickly bolstered by outspoken military veterans who criticized the “rules of 
engagement” on the part of St. Louis County Police45. Even journalists on the scene of 
the initial Uprising were struck by the tactics used. Journalist Jelani Cobb recounts: 
What transpired in the streets appeared to be a kind of municipal version of shock 
and awe [emphasis added]; the first wave of flash grenades and tear gas had 
played as a prelude to the appearance of an unusually large armored vehicle, 
carrying a military-style rifle mounted on a tripod. The message of all of this was 
something beyond the mere maintenance of law and order: it’s difficult to imagine 
how armored officers with what looked like a mobile military sniper’s nest could 
quell the anxieties of a community outraged by allegations regarding the 
excessive use of force. It revealed itself as a raw matter of public intimidation.46 
 
                                                          
45 Capps, “War Veterans Criticize the Tactics of Military-Armed Police in Ferguson.” 
46 Cobb, “What I Saw in Ferguson.” 
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In Ferguson, the nights that included property damage to local businesses significantly 
influenced the ways in which narratives were constructed about Ferguson residents and 
thus justified the presence of heavily armed militarized law enforcement agencies. This 
betrays a mentality that is better aligned for “us versus them” instead of “protect and 
serve.” A community in mourning becomes the enemy. It is due to this response that I 
ranked the St. Louis County Police (SLCP) as taking a “calling all cars” approach.  
A major shift in police tactics came in this episode when the Missouri State 
Highway Patrol took over on August 15, 2014. Captain Ronald S. Johnson employed a 
new approach and stated that he would “mak[e] sure we’re not taking resources out there 
that we don’t need”47. Johnson even participated in an afternoon march with about 300 
community members along West Flourissant Avenue48. This was a marked contrast from 
the previous displays and interactions on the part of the FPD and the St. Louis County 
Police—and came with derision from those agencies who wanted to continue the hardline 
approach to policing the protests. Capt. Johnson can be seen in photographs pulling other 
officers back from protesters as most are dressed in basic police uniforms and others have 
vests and gas masks49. Under the leadership of Capt. Johnson, the MSHP typically 
approached the protests with a “nothing to see here” approach. There was a more 
community-centered policing approach taken and sensitivity to the emotions and 
                                                          
47 McDermott, “Commander Promises ‘Different Approach.’” 
 
48 Ibid.  
 
49 Steele, #Ferguson: The Photography of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
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responses to the protesters. This is evidenced by the fact that only about 9%, or 26 total, 
of the total arrests occurred August 14-17, 2014, the four days the MSHP was in charge50.  
Chart 2: Agency Response vs. Militarization 
 
Despite the highest militarization score, the Missouri National Guard did not rank 
the highest on the approach scale due to the fact that it does not have arrest authority in 
Missouri51. This led to the designation of a “dirty Harry” approach for the MNG. The 
Guard was deployed by Gov. Nixon in an attempt to protect the police after the 
breakdown of a brief period of peaceful relationships with the Missouri State Highway 
Patrol. However, I argue that the presence of a highly militarized force contributed to the 
performances of the other agencies that had higher militarization scores as well. For 
example, the St. Louis County Police may not have had as an elite and well trained force 
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as the Missouri National Guard did, but they hyper-performed a militaristic style of 
repression in Ferguson that belongs more in cinematic realms of combat performance 
than on domestic streets.  
St. Louis County Police ranked the highest on the agency approach scale and had 
a rather high militarization score as well. I argue that this agency has the most dynamic 
interactions between protesters given that this department was given control over policing 
protests almost immediately after the death of Brown. Agents with this department were 
very often hostile in their engagements with the communit. How did its comparatively 
high militarization (especially compared to the FPD) as well as its ability to make arrests 
(which the MNG was not able to do) contribute to its approach to the ten days of protest? 
I argue that the response of the SLCP was escalated by the presence of a highly 
militarized force (MNG) and the SLCP used its arrest powers to perform a more 
aggressive response to protesters. The number of protesters each night was relatively 
stable over the course of the protest episode. Yet there was a spike in arrests and force 
used after a period of peace under the MSHP once the MNG was called in for 
“reinforcement”52 These factors led me to designate the SLCP with a “calling all cars” 
approach.  
The state expanded and escalated its use of force by way of intimidation and 
incarceration in an attempt to put an end to the protests and return control of the 
community to law enforcement and government officials. We can see that, even with 
                                                          
52 See Chart 3 for more detail 
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relatively stable protest numbers, arrests varied wildly. The most arrests came in the first 
day (32% of protesters arrested) and the last three days (22-39% of protesters arrested)53.  
Chart 3: Arrests Reported 
 
Law enforcement agencies and protesters in Ferguson demonstrated different 
types of power throughout the protest cycle which contributed to the varied responses to 
individual protest events. By attempting to exert a specific power over demonstrators, the 
law enforcement agencies involved in the repression of the Ferguson Uprising increased 
their use of militarized force and violence upon the crowds that gathered in mourning and 
defiance.  
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DISCUSSION  
As a marginalized community with little institutional and political power, the 
residents of Ferguson necessarily represented a relatively “weak” movement, but one that 
posed a threat to the State due to the movement’s fervent response to the extrajudicial 
killing of Michael Brown. Through the ten days of the protest episode under 
investigation, the crowd’s characteristics and tactics shifted, leaving law enforcement 
officials to request particular repressive tactics be used. As Earl describes throughout her 
research, a movement that is both threatening and weak will be a major target of 
repression (Earl 2003). However, once the first protest episode had culminated, how can 
we understand the aggressive response of law enforcement as the movement grew and 
gained power and notoriety? With sensational images of community members-turned-
activists on the front pages of newspapers and trending on social media54, the movement 
necessarily outgrew its “weak” designation while maintaining its threat to State power 
through direct action. The state’s use of force during the episode under examination can 
lead us to consider a new approach for understanding how movements outgrow or 
transform their level of weakness and threat. In this way, we can move towards a more 
nuanced concept of repression.  
The Ferguson Uprising saw several different types of law enforcement agencies 
attempt to squash the outcry from the community. The use of four different law 
enforcement agencies spanning both local and federal departments—each with 
                                                          
54 Freelon, McIlwain, and Clark, “Beyond the Hashtags.” 
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increasingly militaristic repertoires of ammunition and equipment—can be viewed as a 
collaboration of a spectrum of repressive state actors. Each of these agencies have at their 
disposal a variety of weapons and tactical gear that they don in expectation of violence on 
the part of protesters. Present in Ferguson, both by the Ferguson Police Department and 
other State and Federal agencies that were called in for support, was an excess of 
militarized equipment and gear—tanks, flashbang grenades, military-style camouflaged 
uniforms, and short-barreled 5.56-mm rifles equipped with scopes55. State actors seem to 
anticipate reciprocal use of violence on the part of protesters. However, we can see that 
protesters are largely unarmed in the case of Ferguson. Their only threats to these 
agencies is the size of those that assembled and the inherent challenge to the legitimacy 
of the state through mass defiance. By having certain lethal and militaristic equipment at 
their disposal, law enforcement agencies are more inclined to utilize more force than 
necessary to disperse crowds and discourage participation in protest. The Ferguson 
Uprising complicates this perspective due to the layers of agencies that were utilized. Earl 
et al. indicate that the better resourced and trained a department is, the less likely that 
department is to use violence as a tactic for controlling a protest (2003:586-7). Ferguson 
suggests that this is not the always the case. In Ferguson, we did not necessarily see a 
blurring of the line but a marriage of militaristic forces. The less militarized agencies 
tended to adopt hyperbolic performances of the more militarized agencies.  
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How can we utilize the perspective of increased militarization of civilian police 
departments to further our understanding of the mechanisms that created the specific 
types of repression experienced in Ferguson? The interaction between civilian 
departments and military groups (i.e. the National Guard) created a tension in Ferguson 
that resulted in near-lethal use of force that was not commensurate with the dissent 
activities of demonstrators. The merging and cooperation of local and Federal agencies as 
a tool of repression against Ferguson protesters allows us to analyze the militarization of 
civilian departments in a way that can shed light on the performance of repression. With 
the Ferguson demonstrators performance of “Hands up! Don’t shoot!”, law enforcement 
agencies had an opportunity to respond in myriad ways. Their ultimate script to follow 
led to the “iron fist” approach to repression. Launching of tear gas and the shooting of 
rubber bullets was chosen as the method of repression performance by the most 
militarized agencies. In the assemblage of law enforcement, officers performed according 
to the equipment and scripts available to them—that of advanced weaponry and 
militaristic tactics. From their costuming to their equipment, these agents were prepared 
for specific scripts to play out in the demonstrations. The anticipation of violence and 
increased unrest contributed to the performance of police in the protest episode under 
study. Police militarization plays into the concept of the performance of power for the 
purposes of this study. Increased militarization and the changing character of law 
enforcement equipment and tactical dress have contributed to the ways in which tactics 
for addressing protest have evolved over time. It can be argued that the presence of a 
militarized police force contributes to the use of excessive force on demonstrators. That 
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is, the very presence and access to militarized equipment has the ability to cause 
excessive response to protesters. I argue that when agencies with varying levels of 
militarization and approach styles interact, the more militaristic and repressive tactics will 
be adopted by all agencies as the lesser agencies learn how to perform more repressive 
scripts.   
While theories of power, discourse, and performativity alone have been useful in 
furthering an understanding of how repression functions in response to mass resistance up 
to this point in time, I argue that these perspectives must necessarily be used in 
conjunction with one another to more fully capture the evolution of repression, 
particularly as it is influenced by increased militarization of local law enforcement 
agencies. As the state adapts to changing conditions—and as people adapt to these 
conditions as well—it will be valuable to return to current theoretical models that can 
analyze power structures, dominant narratives, and other frameworks that shape 
repression. A broader definition of repression and collective violence will be necessary 
moving forward to be able to explain and predict how various arms of the state will 
respond to seemingly spontaneous uprisings. The application of theories of 
performativity from both sociological and feminist disciplines can help to reveal the 
subtleties that can be overlooked with singularly focused perspectives. By focusing on 
performativity as a major contributing factor to the role of repression, actions taken by 
the state in response to mass resistance can be understood in new ways. Repression is not 
a singularly defined response, but one that is informed by resources, organization, and 
culture that creates scripts to be followed and roles to be adapted in response to protests.  
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Throughout this project, I have attempted to return to the question of how 
performativity and militarization interact with and inform one another in the context of 
protest policing. I questioned and analyzed what kinds of scripts different agencies 
seemed to follow—whether by formal training or by acting in accordance with perceived 
styles of engagement. Future scholars may take this perspective and apply it to further 
research on repression. Larger scale studies could be performed to look at other protest 
episodes in the context of Ferguson and how they evolved over time. Other cities who 
faced similar circumstances of police involved shootings that spawned protest events 
could also be studied to determine how the state has evolved its tactics and how their 
resources shape the types of repression used. Future research might also question how 
other cities used Ferguson as a model for developing their own tactics. It may also be 
useful to comparatively examine how repressive tactics functioned both before and after 
Ferguson. With the rate of militarization and police shootings increasing over time, it is a 
timely and prudent area of study that can benefit from a feminist epistemological 
intervention.  
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